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RECENT CASE COMMENTS

ever the injured employee desires. 21 If he decides to sue at law,
it tias been held constitutional to hold the employer liable without
fault for the injury sustaine& 22 The express ground of decision of
the principal case would thus seem to be at variance with these
cases as to the right to provide for judicially imposed iability without fault for nonsubseribing employers as an incident to a coordinated compensation system.
If recognition isonce accorded to the fact that it is within the
limits of the due process clauses to deprive a subscribing or nonsubscribing employer of his common-law defenses, to make a subscriber liable without fault under both the compulsory and elective
acts, at law or before the administrative body or officer and to impose a compulsory act upon all employers, it would seem no great
departure to take the further step and impose absolute liability
upon a nonsubscribing employer. It is not a matter of punishing
the employer, since he is not engaging in blameworthy conduct but he is creating hazards, necessary though they may be to society. Notions of fairness cannot require that the risk should fall
on the employee, and it is submitted, that since the employer can
readily escape liability by electing to accept the provisions of the
compensation act, it is neither arbitrary, nor counter to any conception of fairness to impose upon a nonsubscriber absolute liability.28
A. A. A.
CountEAng- POWER OF CH&nCERY TO PuNISH. - An attorney
for the special receiver of the defendant coal company filed an
answer to an order by the court directing him to pay a certain
sum to the receiver, averring that he had paid the sum. The receiver's receipt showed such a payment. On examination it was
found that the answer had been drafted in anticipation of a payment which had never been made. Both the attorney and the receiver were found guilty of contempt of court. The question was
21 Fabler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 960, 194 N. W. 695 (1923).
22 Fabiler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 960, 194 N. W. 695 (1923); State of
North Dakota v. Watland, 51 N. D. 710, 201 N. W. 680 (1924).
231,,... we cannot assent to the proposition that the rights of life, liberty,
and property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment prevent the States
from modifying that rule of the common law which requires or permits the
workingman to take the chances in such a lottery.), Arizona EmployersLiability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 423-424, 39 S. Ct. 553, 63 L. lEd. 1058 (1918).
"The common law system of rights and remedies as it existed at the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution did hot
thereby acquire a perpetual guarantee against change by legislative processes."
0moNAL
L&w 547 (1939).
RosTsoaAEFPE, CoNsTr
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whether a criminal contempt proceeding would properly lie on the
chancery side of the circuit court. Held, that a chancery court has
jurisdiction over civil contempt therein; and that although a criminal contempt proceeding, whether or not the contempt was committed in the chancery court, should be docketed and heard on the
law side of the court in order to conform to well-established procedural precedents, it does not constitute reversible error to enter
such an order on the chancery side of the court. Halam v. AZpta
Coal Corp'l%.
The power of courts, both civil and criminal, to punish for
contempt was derived from the power of the King to punish direct
insults. 2 This power to punish for contempt was delegated to the
judges of the English courts for the punishment of insults to
themselves not as judges but as lords. Later active contempt was
extended to any act which insulted the court or directly prevented
it from administering justice; and finally any disobedience to a
writ of the King was held to be contempt of the King's seal.3 Thus
under the common law of England the courts had the inherent
power to punish for contempt. That principle became part of our
common law and is the source of early statutes on the subject.'
Without this power, the machinery for enforcing obedience to
judgments, orders, aud judicial writs could not possibly function,5
and the administration of the law would be in danger of being
thwarted by the lawless.6
While giving lip-service to this principle, the legislature and
the courts of West Virginia restricted the power of equity to
punish for contempt. In 1873 the West Virginia legislature provided that for a contempt of court, othe than for the nonperformance of or the disobedience to a judgment, decree, or order, a writ
of error should lie to a judgment of the circuit court.7 Construing
this statute in the light of the holding in the Virginia ease of
Balimore & Ohio R. R. v. City of Wheeling, our supreme couit
19

S. E. (2d) 818 (W. Va. 1940).

2 Beale, Contempt of Court, CriminO and CiviZ (1908) 21 HAFv. L. REV. 161.
a

Beale, supran. 2.

4 Blankenburgh v. Commonwealth, 260 Mass. 369, 157 N. E. 693 (1927).

5Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 S. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997 (1904);
State v. Frew and Hart, 24 W. Va. 416 (1884).
o State v. Prew and Hart, 24 W. Va. 416 (1884) ; August v. Gilmer, 53 W.
Va. 65, 44 S. E. 143 (1903).
7 W. Va. Acts 1872-73, c. 174.
8 13 Gratt. 40, 57 (1855) Moncure, J.: A contempt of court is in the nature
of a criminal offense; and the proceeding for its punishment is in the nature
of a criminal proceeding. The judgment in such a proceeding can be reviewed,
by a superior tribunal, only by writ of error, and not always in that way."
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held that, upon the service and return of the rule, the proceeding
should be placed upon the law docket and entitled, "The State of
West Virginia at the relation of the person at whose instance the
rule was issued, against the person accused of contempt," and that
farther proceeding should be had upon the law side.'
The first recognition that these holdings were inconsistent with
the common-law doctrine of the court's inherent power to punish
for contempt is found in State v. Fredlock.10 In that case, however,
there was an attempt to reconcile the two views. The trend back
toward the common-law doctrine nevertheless continued, and
punishment of contempt by a chancery court was allowed where the
commitment was not so much to punish as to compel obedience. 1
It remained, however, for the case of Smith V. Smith12 to determine definitely that a civil contempt proceeding could be had
in equity. Judge Poffenbarger pointed out that the argument that
all contempts are of a criminal nature was fallacious and that
the statute meant that only certain contempts should be reviewable;
those not expressly allowed a right of review were not reviewable
since they were not so at common law."8
The question still remains as to the power of a court of equity to
punish purely criminal contempt. The principal case holds that a
proceeding for criminal contempt brought on the chancery side is
not reversible error. 4 Why should the court consider it as error
at all? It has been shown that the power of the courts to punish
9 Sta;e v. Harpers Ferry Bridge Co., 16 W. Va. 864 (1880) ; Ruhl v. Ruhl, 24
W. Va. 279 (1884) ; State v. Irwin, 30 W. Va. 404, 4 S. E. 413 (1887).
10 52 W. Va. 232, 43 S. E. 153 (1902) : "Our circuit court is a single court
exercising both law and equity jurisdiction, and the proceeding is as effectual
to vindicate and uphold the dignity of the court as a court of equity, as if the
proceeding were had on the chancery side of the court."
"iPetrie v. Buffington, 79 W. Va. 113, 90 S. E. 557 (1916); Ex partc
Beavers, 80 W. Va. 34, 91 S. E. 1076 (1917).
1281 W. Va. 761, 95 S. B. 199 (1918): "Under practically all of the earlier
decisions... lies the fallacious assumption of a right of review for errors in
the sentence or order, in all cases of contempt. From the lack of provision for
review otherwise than by writ of error, the court inferred legislative intent to
make all contempts criminal, to the end that they may be so reviewed. This
process of interpretation completely overlooked plainly expressed legislative
purpose not to allow review at all, for mere error, in certain classes of cases,
namely, non-performance of, or disobedience to, a judgment, decree or order.
(At p. 769.)
13 Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L. Ed. 391 (U. S. 1822) ; Blankenburgh
v. Commonwealth, 260 Mass. 369, 157 N. E. 693 (1927); State v. Van Bittuer,
102 W. Va. 677, 136 S. E. 202 (1926) ; Wells v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 500
(Va. 1871). For statute giving the right of review see W. Va. Acts 1872-73,
c. 174.
14 Hallam v. Alpha Coal Co., 9 S. E. (2d) 818 (W. Va. 1940).
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for contempt is inherent. Construing the statute 5 which allows
writs of error in certain classes of contempt in light of the above
doctrine, either there would be no review of punishment for
criminal contempt in chancery, or the statute would be open to the
construction that some other means of review would lie ;"6so it
would seem that the statute would not preclude chancery's power
to punish for criminal contempt. It has been held that the courts
of chancery have jurisdiction to punish for civil contenpt.17 The
distinction between civil and criminal contempt is of little imTo deny courts of equity the power to punish for
portance.'
criminal contempt would seem to be as much a restriction, upon
chancery as a denial of the power to punish for civil contempt. 9
There is no force to the argument that a court of equity is not
equipped to punish contempt in the nature of a crime. There is no

necessity for a jury in contempt cases, nor is there need to bring
witnesses to testify; the court may act summarily without indictment and without jury.2"
Finally, weight must be given to the statute which gives courts
the power to proceed summarily in punishing the enumerated in15 W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 160, § 4. The statute was enacted in 1873
and provides that II To the judgment of a circuit court for a contempt of court
other than for the non-perforimnance of, or disobedience to, a judgment, decree or order, a writ of error shall lie from the supreme court of appeals. "I The
writer has been unable to find this provision in W. VA. REv. CODE (1931). The
reviser's note to c. 62, art. 7, reports that c. 160, § 4 of W. VA. CODE (Barnes,
1923) is covered in c. 58, arts. I and 5. From this it may be presumed that it
was the intention of the revisers to include c. 160, § 4 in W. VA. REv.. CODE
(1931).
1 See language of court in note 12, sipra.
17 Smith v. Smith, 81 W. Va. 761, 95 S. E. 199 (1918).
isState v. Van Bittner, 102 W. Va. 677, 136 S.E.202 (1926). Judge Woods
states that: "Both are violations of the court's order, and strike at the power,
dignity and authority of the court. Both are subversive to good government.
The eontemnor disregards the command of organized society proceeding through
its courts, relying for justification upon his own judgment although in violation
of the established forms of law. When the courts cease to function in full

force and vigor, society will revert to its primitive order."

(At p. 686.)

19 The court in Rz parte Kearny, 7 Wheat. 38, 44, 5 L. Ed. 391 (1822) refers to a statement made by Blackstone: "The sole adjudication of contempt,
and the punishment thereof, belongs exclusively and without interfering, to each
respective court."I In State v. Fredlock, 52 W. Va. 232, 238, 43 S.E.153 (1902),
the court said, concerning the entrance of the rule on the law side of the court:
"This is not in conflict with the proposition that all courts are vested with the
power to punish for contempt. Our circuit court is a single court exercising
both law and equity jurisdiction, and the proceeding is as effectual to vindicate
and uphold the dignity of the court as a court of equity, as if the proceeding
were had upon the chancery side of the court." While this view might be
true in a jurisdiction where one court administers both law and equity, in a
state such as New Jersey, where the courts of law and equity are separate, the
fallacy of this argument is apparent.
20 State v. Fredlock, 52 W. Va. 232, 43 S.E. 153 (1902).
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stances of contempt. 21 The Smith case could have been based partly on the fact that this statute 2 was intended by the legislature to
be applicable to both law courts and chancery tribunals.28
Since the conclusion reached by the instant case is that the
order should be entered upon the law docket in order to conform
to the well-established procedural precedents, in view of the fact
that the recent tendency seems to be away from those precedents,
it would seem that the court should have gone further and held
that the entry on the chancery side of the order imposing punishment was not error.
W. H. S.
DEEDS -

CONSTRUCTION -

Wnxa

NOT

mFECT

,v UN

THE

FUTURE. - In consideration of love and affection and one dollar, X
and her husband executed an instrument, without warranty, granting to their children in fee a tract of land. The instrument contained the clause, "this grant does not take effect until the death
of the said Mary E. Queen. . . .", and was promptly recorded.
Held, that the instrument will be construed as a deed vesting in
the Orantee an immediate estate though its enjoyment is postponed
until the grantor's death. Liggett v. Rotr.1
In the early English case of Adams v. Savage2 it was held that
a use limited after-an estate for years to a person not in esse was
bad as a contingent remainder unsupported by a freehold. This
type of estate was impossible at common law because there was no
one to take the seisin at the time of the conveyance.8 But, by way
4
of a use, a freehold could be granted to commence in the future.
Later English cases' hold that a future contingent devise after
an estate for years is a good executory devise and not a bad remainder. As there is no intelligible difference between a springing
executory devise and a spr;inging use, if the above estate were
created by deed it would be a valid springing use in England today21W. VA. Rv. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 5, §§ 26-27.
22 W. VA. CODE (Hogg, 1913) e. 147, § 27.
23 Hallam v. Alpha Coal Co., 9 S. E. (2d) 818 (W. Va. 1940).
17 S. E. (2d) 867 (W. Va. 1940).
2 2 Ld. Raym. 854, 92 Eng. Rep. R.

71 (1703).
a Adams v. Savage, 2 Ld. Raym. 854, 92 Eng. Rep. R. 71 (1703) ; Rawley v.
Holland, 22 Vin. Abr. 189, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 753, 22 Eng. Rep. B. 638 (1712).
4 GRAY, Rums AGAINST PERPETurriEs (3d ead. 1915) 54.
5 Gore v. Gore, 2 P. Wims. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. R. 629 (1722) ; Harris v. Barnes,
4 Burr. 2157, 98 Eng. Rep. B. 125 (1768).
6 GRAY, RuLE AGAINsT PERPETUITIES 54.
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